NOTES
REACHING BEYOND PERFORMANCE
COMPENSATION IN ATTEMPTS TO OWN
TIE CORPORATE EXECUTIVE
JOSHUA A. KREINBERG

"Grab a man by his W-2 and his heart and mind will follow."'
INTRODUCTION

It is axiomatic that proprietors seek to ensure that the efforts
of all company employees redound to the benefit of the corporate
enterprise. Nowhere during the past year, however, have misguided
attempts to lead the heart and mind of the employee been more
blatantly evident than in the securities industry. Celebrated firms
such as Kidder Peabody & Co. and Barings PLC have experienced
financial disasters that were caused in no small part by their incentive compensation programs for high level officials.
In April 1994, a scandal rocked Kidder Peabody & Co. (Kidder), an institution where compensation is largely based on performance and where many brokers generate $1 million per year in
commissions.' Kidder fired Joseph Jett, a government-bond chief
who reportedly created some $350 million in "fake profits" to
cover for losses of $85 million over a two-and-a-half-year period.
Jett claimed his supervisors were aware of his trading practices
and even had directed him in his actions. 4 A Securities and Ex-

1.

George Anders, The "Barbarians" in the Boardroom, HARV. Bus. REV., July-

Aug. 1992, at 79, 81 (quoting Donald Herdrich of Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co.).
2. See Anita Raghavan, GE Moves to Quell Kidder Defections with Stock Bonuses,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 1994, at B16 (describing Kidder compensation); Michael Siconolfi,
Kidder Expected to Slash Staff, Exit Some Lines, WALL ST. J.,Oct. 4, 1994, at A3, A8
[hereinafter Siconolfi, Kidder Expected to Slash Staff]; Michael Siconolfi, To Spin Off
Kidder Unit, GE Needs to Inject $2.5 Billion, Report Says, WALL ST. J., Sept. 21, 1994,

at C1, C25 [hereinafter Siconolfi, To Spin Off Kidder Unit]; Michael Siconolfi, Jett Fires
Back, Says Kidder Refuses Data, WALL ST. J.,Sept. 7, 1994, at C1, C17 [hereinafter
Siconolfi, Jet Fires Back].
3. Siconolfi, To Spin Off Kidder Unit, supra note 2, at C1.
4. Id.; Siconolfi, Kidder Expected to Slash Staff, supra note 2, at A3.
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change Commission (SEC) report found "lax oversight" by Kidder
executives but did not discuss why the company had allowed these
executives to keep bonuses based on Jett's "phantom profits. 5
The extent of knowledge and acceptance of Jett's activities remains unknown, but the scandal led to the departures of Kidder's
chairman/CEO, its bond chief, its derivatives chief, and other senior executives. In addition, some of the departing officers as well
as Kidder itself face SEC civil administrative charges for "failure
to supervise"; Kidder continues to incur legal costs in its arbitration with Jett.6 The scandal contributed to a $475 million loss in
19947 which in turn led to a "sweeping restructuring," including
the layoff of 550 employees, a reduction of assets, and a departure
from certain business lines.' Kidder's parent company, General
Electric, eventually sold the troubled securities firm.
In a tragically similar situation, Barings PLC (Barings), a 233year-old British banking institution recently collapsed and was
taken over by Internationale Nederlanden Groep NV.9 One of the
reasons for this collapse may have been Barings' incentive compensation plan, which traditionally led to the payment of 50% of
gross earnings in the form of bonuses.'" Derivatives trader Nicholas Leeson, who stood to receive a bonus in 1994 of more than
$500,000, made considerable contributions to the profitability of
Barings' Singapore operations until his high volume trading in
Japanese futures and options resulted in more than $1 billion of
losses in late February 1995." Investigating authorities believed
that Leeson's superiors in London and Asia, many of whom would
have received bonuses ranging from $1.4 million to $2.6 million,
were aware of the risky transactions.'" Letters, internal audits,
5.
6.

Siconolfi, Jett Fires Back, supra note 2, at Cl, C17.
Id. at Cl; David E. Kalish, Legal Tussle Highlights Arbitration Weaknesses, DUR-

HAM HERALD-SUN, Oct. 16, 1994, at C4, C7; Michael Siconolfi & Laurie P. Cohen, Kidder, Three Ex-Officials Likely to Face SEC Charges, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 1995, at A3.
7. See Siconolfi, To Spin Off Kidder Unit, supra note 2, at Cl; Michael Siconolfi,
GE's Kidder Wins Round in Dispute with Joseph Jett, WALL ST. J., Oct. 7, 1994, at C17.
8.

Michael Siconolfi & Laura Jereski, Kidder Facelift Will Slash Its Wall Street Role,

WALL ST. J., Oct. 7, 1994, at Cl.
9.

See Marcus W. Brauchli et al., Broken Bank. Barings PLC Officials May Have

Been Aware of Trader's Position, WALL ST. J., Mar. 6, 1995, at Al, A7; Nicholas Bray,
Barings Failed to React to Warnings, Preceding Collapse, Evidence Suggests, WALL ST. J.,
July 7, 1995, § B at 3A; Edith M. Lederer, Bank's Brass Faces Reports of Misdeeds,

DURHAM HERALD-SUN, Mar. 6, 1995, at Al, A2.
10.
11.
12.

Brauchli et al.,
supra note 9, at A7.
Id. at Al, A7.
Bray, supra note 9, § B at 3A; see also Nicholas Bray & Glenn Whitney,
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meetings with regulators, and the sheer size of the twenty-eightyear-old's positions, which required that the London offices transfer more than $890 million to cover the Singapore office's trading,
indicate that others probably were aware of Leeson's trades. 3
Such performance pay schemes in the securities field represent
the typical response to public controversy in recent years over the
compensation of high-level corporate executives. 4 In 1991, the
view that executive pay was "spiraling out of control" induced
some members of Congress to attempt to restrict compensation for
corporate officersY' Similarly, after former President George Bush
made a trade-related trip to Japan in 1992 accompanied by American executives whose compensation far exceeded that of their Japanese counterparts at the negotiating table, many Americans ques-6
tioned the need to pay the country's top executives so dearly.1
Furthermore, populist attacks on the pay of business leaders rose
to the level of a "politically
correct" national pastime during the
7
last presidential campaign.'
Executive compensation continues to receive a high degree of
coverage in the popular press." The pundits of corporate governance proclaim that grabbing a corporate executive's W-2 allows
one to guide his heart and combat excesses at the top of the corporate ladder. 9 They believe that performance pay represents the

Barings Collapse Tied to Wide Cast in Special Report, WALL ST. J., July 19, 1995, at A5.
13. Brauchli et al., supra note 9, at Al, A7.
14. E.g., DEREK BOK, THE COST OF TALENT 3 (1993) (citing surveys that show publie support for increased taxation of such highly paid individuals); John A. Byrne, The
Flap Over Executive Pay, Bus. WK., May 6, 1991, at 90; Sarah A.B. Teslik, Tell Me
Again Why the CEO Got a Bonus, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, July 25, 1994, at 10 (dis-

puting the notion that "a little larceny at the top will have next-to-no effect on the bottom line").
15. Bill to Check Executive Pay, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1991, at D2 (statement by Sen.
Carl Levin).
16. BOK, supra note 14, at 95.
17. Andrew R. Brownstein & Morris J. Panner, Who Should Set CEO Pay? The

Press? Congress? Shareholders?, HARV. Bus. REV., May-June 1992, at 28, 28-29 (highlighting the issue that drew the attention of people such as then-Governor Bill Clinton
and Vice President Dan Quayle).
18. See, eg., The Wall Street Journal Reports-Executive Pay, WALL ST. J., Apr. 12,

1995, at R1-R16.
19. See, e.g., Susan L. Martin, The Executive Compensation Problem, 98 DICK. L.
REv. 237, 237-39 (1994); Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives-It's

Not How Much You Pay, But How, HARV. Bus. REv., May-June 1990, at 138, 139 (outlining the benefits of performance pay); see also Brownstein & Panner, supra note 17, at
32 (criticizing proposed legislation that would limit deductibility of executive pay).
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sole acceptable 2' solution and that other alleged remedies are
"wrong headed." Some of the best human capital in business
has been exhausted in efforts to artificially construct pay packages
that create incentives for executives to maximize certain economic
indicators. By drawing the attention of corporate management to
economic and financial measurements, proponents of performance
pay claim that executives will behave appropriately and that pay
levels no longer will be a problem: If the whole corporation is
doing well, high executive pay is acceptable. An executive's salary
is considered to be just "peanuts" compared to the corresponding
benefits to the company.21 Similarly, if the corporation is not performing well, performance pay's supporters allege that compensation should be of no concern because it will not reach high levels.
Incentive pay offers a panacea purporting to solve all corporate
governance ills. Seduced by the excitement of the performance-pay
system, regulatory bodies that act through the legislative and administrative media of tax law' and securities disclosure" largely
endorse the use of performance pay.
Notwithstanding these perceptions of the performance-pay
pundits, the executive pay package is only the symptom of a much
deeper, yet simpler, problem of corporate governance-the divergence of ownership and management interests. Management and
ownership of the public company have become separated as corporate governance mechanisms have failed to create effective incentives and rewards for management's contribution to long-term corporate wealth. Although pay-for-performance purports in theory to
realign management interests with those of ownership, the application falls far short of its objective and is not as effective as longterm equity ownership. With multiple inherent opportunities for

20. Linda J.Barrs, The Overcompensation Problem: A Collective Approach to Controlling Executive Pay, 68 IND. L.J. 59, 80 (1992) (quoting executive director of United

Shareholders Association, who notes that other remedies do not "address the central
issue, which is pay for performance. It's not how much [executives] get paid, it's how
they get paid.").
21. Dana Wechsler, Would Adam Smith Pay Them So Much, FORBES, May 28, 1990,
at 210, 210 (quoting millionaire investor Warren Buffett as saying "[y]ou'll never pay a

really top-notch executive . . .as much as they [sic] are worth. A million, $3 million or
$10 million, it's still peanuts.").
22. I.R.C. § 162(m)(1) (1995) (disallowing corporate tax deduction for nonperformance based executive compensation greater than $1 million/year).
23.

17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (1994) (requiring inclusion of performance indicators in

graphic and narrative form in proxy materials).
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abuse and manipulation, performance-based compensation packages often are detrimental to the long-term interests of the company;
if taken to the extreme, these packages can even result in the
financial failure of an entire organization as in the Kidder and
Barings cases. The solution, however, lies not with any federally
advocated incentive-pay program but in the flexibility offered by
the court system. The threat of effective judicial analysis of public
corporation compensation decisions would provide the necessary
impetus to remedy the current problem. Lowering the impenetrable legal walls that protect executive compensation decisions would
allow courts to establish standards that are genuinely aligned with
long-term proprietary interests.
This Note addresses the troublesome issues involved with the
pay-for-performance system, as well as executive compensation reform, and advocates that the courts focus on equity ownership as a
solution. The symptom of high aggregate levels of executive compensation is described in Part I. Next, Part II canvasses the theories underlying the performance-system response to executive pay
and outlines the shortcomings of the performance-pay regime: opportunity for manipulation in achievement and in selection of
targets; false sense of security for shareholders; distortion of incentives; and unnecessary complexity. Part III then describes the
pay-for-performance endorsement by Congress and the SEC. The
underlying corporate governance problem of linking the concerns
of proprietors and management by properly motivating and rewarding executives for contributing to the growth of long-term
corporate wealth forms the basis of Part IV. Finally, Part V proposes a system of flexible judicial analysis of compensation decisions in which the court system lowers the procedural defenses to
provide both legitimate evaluation of the pay-setting environment
and a comparison of compensation to the ideals of genuine ownership.
I. THE SYMPTOM-PERCEPTIONS AND EVIDENCE
OF ELEVATED EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION

Even a cursory examination of executive compensation in this
country immediately reveals the symptom: the belief of many
Americans that the level of pay for top corporate officers is far
too high. This view is reinforced by the supporting evidence of
absolute pay in excess of that available to other professions and to
foreign executives. Some survey results indicate that more than
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75% of Americans may find executive compensation levels to be

excessive. 4 Descriptions of the compensation of chief executive
officers (CEOs) and other top level corporate officials include

"mind-numbing," "eye-popping," "breath-taking," "scandalous,"'
and "greed run amok."' 6
A trend of pay escalation is evident from aggregate figures of
executive compensation. 7 Pay surveys place average CEO compensation in major American industrial companies at $3.56 million
for 1994 as compared to $3.28 million in 1993. An analysis of
the 1993 compensation packages of the CEOs of the two hundred

largest American corporations reveals that these corporate heads
received an average of $4.1 million. 9 While the pay of individual

CEOs may have changed in 1993 and reached as high as $45.7
million,3 the average value of pay packages has continued to
climb.3 The package of executive pay usually consists of several

components, including a fixed annual salary, a yearly cash bonus,
and long-term incentive pay.3 2 Even in times of "corporate frugal-

ity" and economic difficulty, CEOs often benefit additionally from
perquisites ranging from the relatively banal, such as use of company cars, boats, and jets, to the more unusual, such as the main-

tenance of personal flower beds and the right to purchase company livestock33 The long-term pay portion of the compensation
24. See BOK, supra note 14, at 95.
25. Id.
26. Barris, supra note 20, at 99 (statement by Robert Reich, Secretary of Labor).
27. The Boss's Pay, WALL ST. J.,Apr. 12, 1995, at R13 (describing annual survey
results that found "the highest total compensation" since the newspaper began printing
such surveys in 1989).
28. CEOs Enjoy Fatter Bonuses This Year, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 4, 1994, at A98
(reporting the results of a survey conducted by Pearl Meyer, a compensation consulting
firm); Firm Says CEO Bonuses Up 37 Percent in 1994, DURHAM HERALD-SUN, Dec. 3,
1994, at D8. For the CEOs of the 350 largest U.S. companies, salary and bonus alone
averaged $1,294,316 in 1994, a figure which is up 8.1% over 1993 figures. Joann S.
Lublin, Raking It In, WALL ST. J.,Apr. 12, 1995, at R1.
29. Brian Dumaine, A Knockout Year, FORTUNE, July 25, 1994, at 94, 94. The Fortune survey used the Black-Scholes method to attempt to value stock option grants. Id. at
103.
30. Id. at 94 (payment for the services of Sanford I. WeiU of Travelers, Inc.).
31. Id. (noting a 28% increase in average CEO compensation from the results of
Fortune's 1992 study); Firm Says CEO Bonuses Up 37 Percent in 1994, supra note 28, at
D8 (reporting that a consulting firm found a 37% increase over 1993 compensation).
32. Graef S. Crystal, Selecting and Valuing Short- and Long-Term Compensation, in
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION: A STRATEGIC GUIDE FOR THE 1990'S 212, 212-13 (Fred K.
Foulkes ed., 1991) [hereinafter EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION].
33. In a Cost-Cutting Era, Many CEOs Enjoy Imperial Perks, WALL ST. J.,Mar. 7,
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plan often is composed of stock options, which are restricted
grants of the company's stock that may not be exercised for a

period of three to five years, and stock appreciation rights, a type
of cash payment which mirrors stock performance.'

Notwithstanding the fact that certain business analysts argue
that levels of compensation do not pose a problem at all absent a
company's poor rating against economic indicators,' others claim
that high pay has several detrimental effects. Morale problems may
be created within corporations that pay top executives extremely
well but do not show comparable generosity to employees down
the corporate ladder.3 6 Recently, the president of a communications labor union local, whose members earn between $25,000 and
$35,000 a year, summed up pay disparities by inquiring "[h]ow
does anyone eaxn a million dollars? ... This is a very greedy
company."'37 Accentuated largely by disproportionate growth during the 1980s when the pay of top executives rose by 212% whereas that of the factory worker increased by only 53%,38 modern ratios of CEO to average worker pay represent a hefty multiple
ranging from 120 to 150."9 The stratification of employees into
highly visible classes within a company can prove detrimental to
overall corporate competitiveness, which depends largely on teamwork.' Labor relations issues aside, large gaps in pay often sig-

1995, at B1, B16.
34. IRA T. KAY, VALUE AT THE TOP: SOLUTIONS TO THE EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION CRISIS 27-30 (1992). The deferred compensation of such long-term pay may create

a misleading effect often present in the most shocking pay figures. One must bear in
mind that some publicized figures include previously granted compensation that merely is
realized by the executive during the current year and reflects a reward for service already rendered. One such example can be seen in the case of Disney CEO Michael
Eisner, whose exercise of stock options worth $203 million in 1993 continues to receive
broad media coverage. E.g., Bernard Weinraub & Geraldine Fabrikant, Disney Roiled
After Dismissal, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1994, at CI, C2. In 1993, Eisner earned the significantly smaller sum of $760,000. Dumaine, supra note 29, at 102.
35. E.g., Jensen & Murphy, supra note 19, at 138 (noting that executive compensation only creates a problem when corporate leaders are paid "like bureaucrats," i.e.,
unrelated to performance).
36. BOK, supra note 14, at 104-05; Teslik, supra note 14, at 10.
37. Stephen Keating, Linking Performance, Pay Not Always Easy, DENVER POST,
July 3, 1994, at G1.
38. Byme, supra note 14, at 90.
39. GRAEF S. CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF EXCESS 27 (1991).
40. Robert W. Keidel, Executive Rewards and Their Impact on Teamwork, in EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, supra note 32, at 150, 152.
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nificantly disrupt firm productivity, even when they are only between management levels.4
Unnecessarily high executive compensation also can be a
misallocation of resources and a drain on the economy. Funds
used to compensate executives could be invested for other purposes such as research and development or the improvement of
equipment and facilities.42 Reasonable compensation motivates an
executive to perform the job, but "[o]nce the carrot is big enough
' Such ecoto encourage total effort, a bigger carrot is wasteful."43
nomic waste reduces the nation's ability to compete in foreign
trade with countries that do not spend vast sums on their top
executives. Industries such as automobile production and oil and
gas distribution, in which the pay of American CEOs outstrips
amounts awarded to Japanese and European corporate leaders by
multiples of five to thirty, serve as prime examples of the competitive disadvantage of U.S. corporations." In Japan, the average
CEO receives sixteen times the salary of an industrial worker,
while the ratio in Germany reaches twenty-one. Performance
compensation plays only a "modest" role in German and Japanese
pay.' Generally using a compensation policy that is antithetical
to the current American system, Japanese corporations seek to narrow the gap in employee compensation in order to increase loyalty, cohesion, and productivity.47 Other arguments against high pay
include the insulating effects of high pay on chief executives,'

41. CEO Pay: How Much Is Enough?, HARV. Bus. REV., July-Aug. 1992, at 130,
136 (statement by Jay W. Lorsch of Harvard Business School).

42. Carl T. Bogus, Excessive Executive Compensation and the Failure of the Corporate
Democracy, 41 BUFF. L. REv. 1, 25 (1993).

43. Id. at 30.
44. Id. at 26.
45.
46.

CRYSTAL, supra note 39, at 206-09.
Michael E. Porter, Capital Disadvantage: America's Failing Capital Investment

System, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1992, at 65, 72; see also Raju Narisetti, Work WeekA Special News Report About Life on the Job-and Trends Taking Shape There, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 1, 1994, at Al (finding only 20% of Japanese-owned companies possess

incentive-pay plans versus 50% among U.S. companies).
47. BOK, supra note 14, at 105.
48. Jacques Delacroix & Shahrokh M. Saudagaran, Munificent Compensations as
Disincentives: The Case of American CEOs, 44 HUM. REL 665 (1991) (finding no link

between the "mythical" social function of performance and pay and arguing that current
high levels of compensation can actually be counterproductive by protecting CEOs from
the basic material consequences of bad performance).
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the needless creation of a self-perpetuating upper class, 49 and the
broad societal incentives created among young people that impact
the distribution of national talent."
Notwithstanding the previously enumerated rationales, the central problem with high executive compensation is its relationship-or lack thereof-to the corporation's long-term interests.
Analysis of compensation, by nature, must rest on a primarily subjective basis;5 that is, who is to say when absolute pay levels are
excessive? Examining pay by considering the officer's direct impact
on long-term wealth creation within his particular corporation
would yield a better evaluation of compensation. While some analysts have attempted to measure the firm-specific relationship between CEO compensation and shareholder wealth, their work falls
short of accounting for genuine impact on the corporate enterprise
as they opt for such proxies as short-term stock price. 2 A complete evaluation of the appropriateness of the level of CEO compensation would demand a thorough analysis of the long-term relationship between each firm's chief executive and the company's
value. In the absence of a firm-specific analysis, societal compensation levels offer limited information, and controlling such aggregate
pay levels should not be an end unto itself.
In analyzing compensation levels, one must focus on two
elements: aggregate pay levels and public opinion. The informational value of aggregate pay comes from its role as a "barometer"
for examining the operation of the corporate model. 3 Theoretically, the corporate structure itself should prevent compensation
figures from rising to levels that are disproportionate to the
executives' role in generating corporate wealth. When public opinion, however, generally views the compensation of CEOs as excessive, further analysis of compensation decisionmaking is necessary.
Public perception may represent an understanding of the imbalance between pay and the long-term economic value that execu-

49. See Bogus, supra note 42, at 17-19.

50. See BOK, supra note 14, at 89, 247-48, 287.
51.

Bogus, supra note 42, at 27. The author suggests that a definition of "excessive"

may be established, but such a measure depends on a factual determination of the situation that the sum in consideration surpasses the lowest level required to attract and motivate individuals while still awarding fair compensation. Id. at 28-29.

52. E.g., Jensen & Murphy, supra note 19, at 150-53 (using a two-year information
window).

53. Bogus, supra note 42, at 80.
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tives have added to the economy. Absolute numbers, when taken
in conjunction with public opinion, should serve to flag one's attention. One would expect that in an ideal, fluid, global market
economy, the pay of CEOs would be roughly similar to that of
their counterparts abroad and most other American professionals,
not including outliers such as professional athletes and entertainers. Thus, indications of high societal CEO compensation levels, a
"barometer [that] has continued to rise,"' represent a potential
symptom of a larger problem-a failure of corporate governance.
II. PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE-A Focus ON THE SYMPTOM

Many proposed solutions focus myopically on the visible
symptom of high compensation levels. By devising absolute limits
on the amounts that may be paid to corporate officers, some proposals emphasize this symptom to an extreme. One solution seeks
to establish a uniform cap on the level of executive pay." Another proposed remedy resurrects a notion advocated by Plato-the
creation of a fixed pay-ratio between the highest and lowest paid
employees within the corporation.56 Pay-ratio proposals have varied on the exact ratio that should exist with suggested multiples
ranging from five to twenty-five times.5 The performance-based
system, however, seems to have triumphed.
Performance pay is not a new idea. Julius Caesar awarded his
soldiers a percentage of the spoils from successful Roman military
endeavors." By 1932, even Babe Ruth recognized the role of performance in compensation when explaining why he earned $5,000
more than President Herbert Hoover, saying: "I had a better year
than he did. 5 9 Similarly, the wide use of performance pay in cor-

54.

Id.

55. BOK, supra note 14, at 117 (noting several problems involved with the Congressional establishment of a mandatory ceiling including issues of valuation and the distortion of the "flow of talent" into occupations).

56. CRYSTAL, supra note 39, at 23-24.
57. E.g., id. at 24. In addition to Plato, the following individuals and entities have
also proposed or used certain fixed ratios in compensation: (1) J.P. Morgan, Id.; (2) busi-

ness guru Peter Drucker, Peter F. Drucker, Is Executive Pay Excessive?, WALL ST. J.,
May 23, 1977, at 20; (3) Ben Cohen of Ben & Jerry's Ice Cream, Keating, supra note

37, at Gi; and (4) Minnesota Congressman Martin Sabo, Income Disparities Act, H.R.
3056, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
58. David J. McLaughlin, The Rise of a Strategic Approach to Executive Compensation, in EXECTIVE COMPENSATION, supra note 32, at 5, 6.
59.

CRYSTAL, supra note 39, at 26.
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porate America dates at least as far back as World War I, when
executives began to receive large portions of their compensation in
the form of bonuses. 6° Shortly thereafter, stock options arose as a
popular form of executive pay during World War 11.61
Whether the employee is a Roman centurion annihilating Carthaginians or a door-to-door vendor pushing encyclopedias on the
Joneses, the same notion exists: Pay can create incentives to direct
and dictate the behavior of individuals. Corporate analysts frequently note the "strategic" importance of the role that compensation assumes for the "success of a business venture." 62 Compensation plans possess the "potential to motivate executives and focus
their energies on behavior that directly supports or fulfills organizational goals." 6 Performance-pay supporters believe that if one
desires certain behavior, one can offer rewards specifically tailored
to generate the achievement of that behavior.
With some 95% of all large corporations favoring the use of
bonuses or merit pay, performance compensation is a model that
is "rarely questioned" and almost blindly accepted in "business
circles" today.' The general notion of linking pay to performance
has found a following in several industries as varied as fund management,65 professional athletics,' custodial services,67 and education.' The populist ideals of social justice where an individual's
rewards ostensibly depend on his personal contribution to the
benefit of the collective entity probably have contributed to the
near total lack of resistance to this notion's application in the
executive compensation context.69

60. BOK, supra note 14, at 39-40.
61. Id. at 40.
62. McLaughlin, supra note 58, at 6, 22; see, e.g., Jan P. Muczyk, The Strategic Role
of Compensation, 11 HUM. RESOURCE PLAN. 225 (1988); Ray Stata & Modesto A.
Maidique, Bonus System for Balanced Strategy, HARV. BUS. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1980, at 156.
63. Bruce Overton, How to Organize, Staff, and Develop Skills Within the Executive
Compensation Function, in EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, supra note 32, at 325, 325.

64. BOK, supra note 14, at 106.
65. Jaclyn Fierman, The Coming Investor Revolt, FORTUNE, Oct. 31, 1994, at 66, 67.
66. It's Officia" 49ers To Be in Prime Time, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 16, 1994, at B14.
67. Steven L. Myers, Giuliani Unveils New Contract With Custodians of City Schools,

N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1994, at Al, A22.
68. Joseph Berger, For Mercer College Teachers: Recruit a Student, Get a Raise, N.Y.
TIMES, June 10, 1995, at 21-24.

69. See BOK, supra note 14, at 106 (describing the "results-oriented ethos" of the
modem corporation as strongly supporting performance pay).
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Performance packages assume the incentive impact of pay and
divide its motivating capacity into artificially constructed elements.
Pay packages attempt to micromanage the decisionmaking processes of executives by forcing them to focus on achieving certain
performance goals. An executive's pay is distributed between specific short-term goals and a few long-term incentives." The desired performance can involve a multitude of criteria-whatever
the directors and their pay consultants select as the proper carrot
to wave for the executive's performance. Examples include achieving certain target levels of return on investment, return on equity,
or volume sales figures. 7' No consensus, however, exists among
business analysts over the specific measures to be targeted.72 Theoretically, the constructed packages should leave executives with
strong incentives to engage in the desired performance. If performance pay were to succeed in encouraging behavior and the objectives had been appropriately crafted, no one would need to worry
about resulting pay levels because the corporation, its shareholders,
and the economy on the whole would have enjoyed the benefit of
increased corporate performance.
If the individual who is targeted values the rewards in a manner similar to the employer, he will strive to attain those rewards.
The behavior, however, must be within the particular person's own
perceived capacity to control. As expectancy theory dictates, if an
individual believes he can achieve rewards and values them appropriately, he will strive to achieve those goals.73 Naturally, the
goals must actually be attainable or the individual will become
frustrated and no longer will be motivated to act.7 4

70. Crystal, supra note 32, at 212-13 (proposing appropriate breakdown between
short-term and long-term measures depends upon the individual company's business cycle); e.g., IBM, PROXY STATEMENT 9-10 (1994).
71. CHARLES T. HORNGREN ET AL, COST ACCOUNTING: A MANAGERIAL EMPHASIS
892-95, 906 (1994).
72. E.g., Seymour Burchman, Choosing Appropriate Performance Measures, in EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, supra note 32, at 189, 194-96 (discussing shortcomings of the use
of accounting measures); KAY, supra note 34, at 189 (disapproving of the use of accounting measures); Michael E. Ragsdale, Executive Compensation: Will the New SEC Disclosure Rules Control "Excessive" Pay at the Top, 61 UMKC L. REV. 537, 564 (1993) (citing research supporting an accounting basis for compensation).

73. See, e.g., Edward E. Lawler III, The OrganizationalImpact of Executive Compensation, in EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, supra note 32, at 129, 131; David J. McLaughlin,
Does Compensation Motivate Executives?, in EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, supra note 32,
at 59, 63, 68.
74. BOK, supra note 14, at 245.
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Even when the corporation's goals are attainable and the
model otherwise has been effectively implemented, performance
pay in American society falls short of its purported objectives. In
attempts to find a panacea for the symptom of the perception of
high CEO compensation, analysts have rushed to endorse the performance-pay system even though the theory that forms the basis
for performance pay may itself be flawed. Although economists
generally accept the notion that money represents a sufficient
motivation, many psychologists and management theorists question
the effectiveness of monetary prizes as the sole incentive for one's
actions.' Other factors such as interest in work, recognition,
achievement, and colleague opinion may influence individuals more
than "crass material rewards."76 Incentive pay holds an "unflattering view" of a self-serving management. 7 Pay may have only a
marginal impact on top corporate executives, the vast majority of
whom already enjoy considerable wealth." Some studies even indicate that pay in excess of a certain point can result in diminished marginal returns and even lower performance levels.79
Performance pay's susceptibility to manipulation, reliance on
micromanagement, and distortion of incentives actually serve to
harm the corporation. The purported performance regime may not
reflect genuine performance at all if it selects inadequate indicators. While appearing to be based on performance, certain pay
packages may be constructed utilizing "various pay gimmicks,"
which actually result in guaranteed levels of compensation largely
independent of management performance and benefit to the company. Poor performance can persist in incentive pay systems,

75. Id. at 22-23 (citing examples such as Chester Barnard, author of that "classic of
management texts, The Function of the Executive," and W. Edwards Deming, "father of
'total quality management"').
76. Id.; see, e.g., Ana Azevado & Leonard H. Chusmir, Motivation Needs of Sampled
Fortune-500 CEOs: Relations to Organization Outcomes, 75 PERCEPTUAL & MOTOR

SKILLs 595 (1992) (finding a correlation between achievement and growth in corporate
sales and power and growth in profits); Bernadette M. Ruf & Leonard H. Chusmir,
Dimensions of Success and Motivation Needs Among Managers, 125 J. PSYCHOL 631

(1992) (noting that power and achievement correlate with personal fulfillment and other
factors in addition to status and wealth).
77. BOK, supra note 14, at 109, 244.
78. Id.
79. Letters to the Editor: CEO Pay Just Greed?, HARV. BUS. REV., Sep.-Oct. 1992, at
193, 194 (letter from Clyde P. Olivier).
80. E.g., CRYSTAL, supra note 39, at 84 (describing method by which Steven J.Ross,
the former CEO of Warner Communications, relied on "pay gimmicks" to ensure his
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such as the now infamous situation of IBM, in which the company's incentive pay system allowed it to offer former CEO John
despite "one of the worst corporate perforAkers large rewards
81
mances in history."
One of the worst forms of guaranteed pay in otherwise performance-dniven compensation packages is the revaluation of options by directors. If the market price of a company's stock has
fallen or has failed to rise sufficiently, an executive's option package may not represent any immediately realizable value. When directors feel that an executive has been underpaid, they may elect
to revalue his compensation by lowering the exercise price of previously granted options. Revaluation allows directors to remove
effectively the downside risk of performance pay while maintaining
some semblance of a competitive compensation. The practice of
option repricing has been analogized to an unusual high jump
event in which the bar one must clear is continuously lowered to
facilitate its clearance.' The ostensible justification for the lowering of pay standards is that an executive has been harmed unfairly
by adverse market conditions.
In addition to revaluation, setting initially low performance
thresholds that are certain to be achieved causes no trouble at all
for boards wishing to secure compensation for their executives. Directors also can grant multiple interlocking performance measures
to ensure that at least one of them will be fulfilled.83 This practice guarantees executives a certain pay level while constructing
the package out of individually risky performance-dependent items
much in the same way as an investment portfolio. Through such
mechanisms, companies may "pile one form of executive compensation on top of another," continuing to raise the level of topmanagement pay independent of corporate performance. 84
compensation level).
81. E.g., Teslik, supra note 14, at 10 (pointing also to examples at General Electric,
Westinghouse, Coca-Cola, and Time-Warner); IBM, supra note 70, at 9, 11 (outlining a
company philosophy of "pay-at-risk," rewarding annual and long-term financial performance and simultaneously paying the departing Akers over $3 million, including an "incentive [bonus] payment" and an additional payment ostensibly in "recognition of his 33
years of service to the Company"). A more mundane example is presented by the 1994
earnings of George Fisher, the CEO of Eastman Kodak Co., who collected a $1.7 million
bonus even though Kodak's earnings fell below its target. Lublin, supra note 28, at R4.
82. CRYsTALT, supra note 39, at 107.
83. Geoffrey Colvin, How to Avoid the CEO Pay Cap, FORTUNE, Mar. 20, 1995, at
18.
84. CRYSTAL, supra note 39, at 107-08 (noting the example of CEO Peter Grace of
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Some indicators also may lend themselves to direct tampering
by the executive after the committee develops the package." Although any individual may experience frustration if he finds himself unable to influence compensation indicators despite his personal efforts to do so, a situation of excessive control over indicators
can result in abuses.86 For instance, focusing pay on financial
measures such as return on equity allows management to increase
its personal compensation by subtly manipulating discretionary
responsibilities such as advancing the sale date of certain assets or
electing a source of project finance. Executives can also "sweeten"
financial reports through such devices as the sale-and-lease-back
arrangements employed by Agee at Morrison Knudsen' or the
advance booking of sales used by executives at Kurzweil Applied
Intelligence.' Similarly, extreme short-run stock price can be manipulated through the disclosure or delay of disclosure of certain
bits of information that do not rise to the level of materiality
necessary for securities law violations.89 Since accounting measures often provide little genuine link to positive long-term corporate performance, removing stock-based compensation with its direct link to shareholder return and relying on "accounting-based,
long-term cash compensation plans" would lead to a "replay of the
1970s, when the tracking of executive compensation and shareholder return was more coincidence than compensation."9
Since performance-pay provides an appealing justification for a
high level of compensation, shareholders may feel a false sense of
security and not properly investigate pay procedures, even though
positive performance indicators may create a mere fagade of contribution to the long-term interests of the company. Even option
revaluation can be defended to shareholders as firms rationalize
the repricing of executive options with strike prices above the

the poorly performing W.R. Grace).

85. See Dean Faust, The SEC's CEO-Pay Plan: No Panacea: Studies Suggest Linking
Pay to Performance Actually Hurts Performance, BUS. WK., July 6, 1992, at 37.
86. BOK, supra note 14, at 245.
87. Joan E. Rigdon & Joann S. Lublin, Call to Duty: Why Morrison Board Fired
Agee, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 1995, at B1, B4.
88. Steve Stecklow, Three Kurzweil Officials Quit, Fourth Fired After Sales Inquiry;
Stock Plunges, WALL ST. J., May 24, 1994, at B7.
89. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 363-64 (Del. 1993).
90. Theodore R. Buyniski, The Past, Present, and Possible Future Role of Executive
Compensation Plans, in EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, supra note 32, at,290, 309.
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market, believing such out-of-the-money options to be of no positive motivational use and a dangerous incentive for executives. 9
More than a justification for poor performance, performancebased systems can distort incentives and actually encourage harmful behavior. If an individual's pay hinges upon the attainment of
a certain economic indicator, he may be willing to allow questionable practices to occur in order to reach the indicator.' Inherent
motivational problems plague performance-pay applications:
[E]fforts to link pay to performance cause professionals to focus
on making more money instead of doing the best possible job.
Those who administer compensation do their best to make the
two goals coincide, but this is rarely possible for the complex
work that most executives and professionals perform. In one way
or another, opportunities arise to boost one's income at the expense of the organization. 9'
Although criminal and civil law usually provide a check on extreme behavior, sufficient freedom exists to engage in marginally
ethical activity.94 A compensation plan that encourages such abuses by employees at any level within the company can severely damage the company's reputation and goodwill. The experience of
Sears Roebuck & Co.'s automotive service department exemplifies
the potentially disastrous results that can accompany performance
pay. Productivity incentives and sales quotas employed at Sears led
to a corporate environment of "pressure, pressure, pressure" as
well as poor quality and a legal settlement of $60 million.95 The
company eventually issued a full page apology in the Wall Street
Journal, stating, "[w]e have concluded that our incentive compensation and goal-setting program inadvertently created an environment in which mistakes have occurred. We are moving quickly and
aggressively to eliminate that environment. 9 6 When the pay of

91. See CRYSTAL, supra note 39, at 71.
92. BOK, supra note 14, at 245 (noting frequent failure of performance-based system
to set rewards "large enough to motivate effectively but not so large as to tempt people
to resort to improper or even illegal behavior to qualify").
93. Id. at 246.
94. See Lynn Sharp Paine, Managing for OrganizationalIntegrity, HARV. BUS. REV.,
Mar.-Apr. 1994, at 106, 108-10 (arguing for need of "organizational ethics" to prevent
poor decisionmaking which led to multimillion dollar losses for several companies).
95. Id. at 107-08.
96. HORNGREN ET AL., supra note 71, at 905 (quoting An Open Letter to Sears Customers, WALL ST. J.,June 25, 1992, at Cl).
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the highest executives hinge on performance-based compensation
measures, the dangers to the system are exacerbated as top management may allow hazardous behavior to filter down the entire
corporate ladder. The financial debacles at Kidder and Barings
serve as testament to the risks of high-level performance pay as
the incentive distortions involved proved to be much greater than
any positive returns from performance measures.
Moreover, the incentive systems often improperly lead to pay
that focuses on short-term indicators. 7 Executives, tied to the
short-term interests of the corporation, may engage in behavior
harmful to long-term corporate needs." Business consultants
claim that neglecting such short-run incentives can lead a corporation into cash-flow trouble as managers risk bankruptcy by planning only for the long-run.99 However, bankruptcy would be unlikely in a genuine long-term proprietary situation because a firm
failure would destroy the financial livelihood of an executive
whose fortunes are linked to the firm. Unlike diversified shareholders, bankruptcy poses a real threat to the professional reputations and careers of executives. Nevertheless, performance pay
places such an emphasis on short-term indicators that one may
wonder who is attending to the company's long-term interests in
this micromanaged incentive compensation system. Shareholders
will do little to alleviate the near-sighted focus of the pay packages of American executives since they hold stock on average less
than two years.' In addition, natural tendencies already exist
for compensation committees to "tacitly" reinforce short-term goals
by their continued reliance on tools such as peer group surveys to
construct pay packages. 1 Long-term equity compensation may
97. E.g., Sue Ellen Dodell, Experience Under the New Rules: Investment Community
Perspective, in 350 EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION REPORTING 1993: LIVING WITH THE NEW
RULES 223, 230 (Stanley Keller & John F. Olson, eds., 1993) [hereinafter EXECUTIVE

COMPENSATION REPORTING] (noting complaints of the New York City Comptroller to
the SEC chair that disclosures including the performance graph would force companies to

focus on current returns rather than goals such as research and development and longterm growth).
98. E.g., BOK, supra note 14, at 112-13 (outlining risks of inventory depletion and
lack of research and development expenditures); see also Molly Baker, I Feel Your Pain?,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 12, 1995, at R6 (noting temptations to engage in "misguided
restructurings, layoffs, and divestitures").
99. See Crystal, supra note 32, at 212.

100. Porter, supra note 46, at 68 (pointing to problems caused by short investment
horizons in country where the average stock holding period fell from seven years in 1960
to two years today).
101.

Walter J. Salmon, Crisis Prevention: How to Gear Up Your Board, HARV. BUS.
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provide a workable solution. When long-term compensation is
used, however, it often lacks any down-side risk."
The performance system is unnecessarily complex. The compensation consulting industry has arisen over the past couple of
decades almost exclusively to service the needs of such micromanaged incentive compensation plans. 03 After establishing the
desired goals, consultants create complex formulas and select esoteric economic indicators to construct artificially a corporate governance instrument that motivates executives to perform their jobs
as if their interests were aligned with those of ownership.Y In
the absence of such time-consuming mental exercises, extensive
economic resources and human capital could be saved and allocated to other more pressing business issues. Federal efforts to mandate such a performance compensation system have primarily served only to make "mighty big winners" out of the "high-priced
comp consultants."' 5 Nevertheless, a vocal contingent of business
pundits, administration officials, legislators, and other institutional
representatives continue to praise incentive compensation for executives, thereby neglecting the underlying problem of corporate
governance and performance pay's contribution to the problem.

III. REGULATORY ROLE-ENDORSEMENT OF PERFORMANCE
The regulatory bodies have succumbed to the performance-pay
wave in electing to focus on the symptom rather than the problem.
Congress and the SEC advocate a performance-pay system for
executives. President Bill Clinton made controlling executive compensation excesses an issue in his 1992 campaign."°6 The regulators seemed to follow through on the implementation of this campaign promise by acting through tax law and proxy rules to control behavior within America's business community. Even if these
regulatory bodies possess the authority to establish potential corporate governance rules,"°7 general concern still can arise as to the
REV., Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 68, 70.
102. See supra text accompanying notes 80-84.
103. CRYSTAL, supra note 39, at 215-16.
104. The consultants' construction of the package will be prone to the upward bias
due to the frequent use of comparison data. Id. at 43-44.
105. Colvin, supra note 83, at 18.
106. E.g., Martin, supra note 19, at 237.
107. The executive compensation regulations could constitute an intrusion into the
prohibited realm of corporate governance. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975); Busi-
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soundness of an executive compensation policy developed by bureaucrats rather than business leaders.
A. Congress
Congressional legislators have considered several measures to
deal with the executive compensation issue." 8 Absolute caps and
ratio systems were rejected in favor of a pay-for-performance
approach. As part of the Omnibus Revenue Reconciliation Act of
1993,19 Congress amended the business expense section of the
tax code so that annual compensation paid to the CEO and the
four other highest paid officers in excess of $1 million is no longer
deductible as an "ordinary and necessary" business expenditure.110 Congress, however, allowed an exception for incentivebased compensation. The cap does not include employee remuneration that is payable "on a commission basis solely on account of
income generated" by the individual's performance."' Additionally, if compensation hinging on the "attainment of one or more
performance goals" meets certain procedural requirements, it may
qualify for the full deduction from income."
The exception provides an obvious incentive for corporations
to structure pay systems based on purported performance indicators. According to one recent survey of public firms, 86% feel that
the tax law affects them, and 69% plan on trying to keep the compensation expense deduction."' Corporations choosing to ignore

ness Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990). The SEC actions have been
described as attempts at "discipline" rather than "disclosure." Joseph Hinsey IV, The
SEC Fix on Executive Pay: Improved Disclosure or Intrusion?, HARV. Bus. REV., Jan.-

Feb. 1993, at 77.
108. See, e.g., Tax Simplification Act of 1993, H.R. 13, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993);
Accountability Act, S. 2329, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992); S. 2330, 102d Cong., 2d Sess.

(1992); Income Disparities Act, H.R. 3056, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (disallowing tax
deduction for executive pay exceeding 25 times that of the lowest paid employee); see
also Corporate Pay Responsibility Act, H.R. 2522, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); S. 1198,

102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (mandating disclosure regarding director and top management compensation).
109. Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13211, 107 Stat. 312, 469-71 (1993). The Act redesignated
subsection (m) as subsection (n) and inserted new subsection (m) to I.R.C. § 162 (1995).

110. I.R.C. §§ 162(a), 162(m)(1), (3) (1995).
111.

Id. § 162(m)(4)(B).

112. Id. § 162(m)(4)(C). Procedure requires that (1) a compensation committee comprised only of "outside directors" establish the goals; (2) shareholders approve them; and
(3) the compensation committee certifies that goals were met. Id.
113.

Gerald A. Achstatter, Will $1 Million Tax Cap Hurt Executive Pay?, INVESTOR'S
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the performance-based option lose their tax deduction and must
explain in disclosures to their shareholders why the corporation's
tax bill was higher than necessary. Although corporations may still
choose to avoid the performance system, they are penalized for
doing so, and shareholder attention will focus on this decision. 4
If litigation results from compensation decisions, a court's attention
could also be drawn to the tax treatment of the sum awarded." 5
The net effect on executive compensation may be merely to force
boards to engage erroneously in "bureaucratic" decisionmaking in
which they closely follow the congressionally approved method of
compensation." 6
B. Securities & Exchange Commission
The SEC has formulated a multifaceted approach to executive
compensation that uses the proxy as a tool to focus on shareholder proposals, communications, and the corporation's compensation
disclosures. Through certain no-action letters"7 and rule changes,"' the Commission has sought to incorporate shareholders
more fully into the compensation process and to facilitate intershareholder communications in general."9 The changes, however,

Bus. DAiLY, Aug. 22, 1994, at A4.
114. Tom Herman, Tax Report: Executive Pay Plans Get a Fresh Look Because of a
Tax-Law Change, WALL ST. J., June 7, 1995, at Al.
115. See Wilderman v. Wilderman, 315 A.2d 610, 615 (Del. Ch. 1974) (listing as a

factor in the determination of the reasonableness of remuneration whether a deduction
would be permitted for the full amount of the executive's salary).
116. See Roberta S. Karmel, Securities Regulation: Focus on Executive Compensation,
N.Y. LJ., Apr. 21, 1994, at 3, 7.
117. On February 13, 1992, the SEC issued multiple no-action letters finding shareholder proposals related to executive compensation nonexcIudable. E.g., Bell Atlantic

Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [1991-92 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
76,110 (Feb. 13, 1992) (attempting to abolish short-term incentive plans for senior management); Chrysler Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [1991-92 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.

Rep. (CCH)

76,103 (Feb. 13, 1992) (seeking to limit senior executive compensation

with a policy of permanent strike price for future stock options); Baltimore Gas & Elec.,

SEC No-Action Letter, [1991-92 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 76,101
(Feb. 13, 1992) (seeking to cap executive pay at 20 times that of the employee average).
In March, the Commission followed its earlier actions by releasing a no-action letter
mandating the inclusion of a request for the company to create a compensation committee. Reebok Int'l Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter, [1991-92 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 76,131 (Mar. 16, 1992).
118.

Regulation of Communication Among Shareholders, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,276 (1992)

(codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b)).
119. E.g., Executive Compensation Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,126, 48,138 (1992) (to

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45:138

have had little impact on the executive compensation decisionmaking process. Few institutional investors take advantage of their
powers, and those that do usually are unsuccessful in their efforts
to exert their influence fully. 2° Institutional investors focus their
efforts largely on Fortune 500 companies and ignore other
firms." In addition, they often side with management on governance issues.'2 The Wall Street Rule-the rule that investors
may "vote with their feet" by selling their shares when they disprove of corporate policy-and the costs/benefit analysis required
of institutional investors combine to ensure that investors will not
act unless the harmful effects of the compensation policy are clearly manifest."z The greater freedom of communication even may
create extra headaches for companies forced to include frivolous
pay-related proposals offered by small investors.' 24 In fact, the
ideal compensation decisionmaking process would not require the
complications of proactive shareholder votes and actions if a legitimate threat of post-decision shareholder review existed.
In October 1992, the SEC also revised the executive compensation disclosure requirements in proxy materials."z Adding to
the original requirements in 1993, the Commission mandated that
the committee outline its attempts to achieve the deductions delin126
eated under section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code.
Pursuant to the goal articulated by the Commission,"z the disclosure sheds more light on the compensation decision process. The
additional requirements, especially those involving disclosure of
revalued options" s and interlocking compensation committee mem-

be codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 228, 229, 240, 249).
120. Martin, supra note 19, at 240.
121. Id.
122. David E. Bergdahl, Shareholder Proposals and Executive Pay: the SEC Makes a
Fundamental Policy Change, 17 S. ILL U. LJ. 117, 130 (1992).

123. See infra text accompanying notes 173-87.
124. Bergdahl, supra note 122, at 117, 134 (describing example of small shareholder
nuisance proposals faced by Bell Atlantic Corp.).

125. Executive Compensation Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,126 (1992) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. §§ 228, 229, 240, 249).
126. Executive Compensation Disclosure; Securityholder Lists and Mailing Requests
Exchange Act Release No. 33,229, Securities Act Release No. 7032, [1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep (CCH) 85,259, at 84,812 (Nov. 22, 1993).
127. See SEC Adopts Proxy Reform Package After Long Study and Intense Debate,
Sec. L. Daily (BNA) (Oct. 16, 1992); 57 Fed. Reg. 48,126.
128. 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(c) (1994) (Instructions to Item 402(c)).
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bership, 29 may force boards and their compensation committees to further develop their executive compensation decisions.
With the new graphical and tabular representations and comparisons against industry and market averages, 3 ' however, the
changes also focus shareholder attention solely on performancebased measures of pay.'3 ' Compensation committee members likewise will be drawn to the easily identifiable performance measures
as the center of their own analysis. Now that proxy materials
publicly link committee members' names with their decisions,"
they have extra incentive to concentrate on the same factors that
will be the principal elements of shareholder analysis. Although
the SEC expressly stated that no additional liability will ensue
under Sections 14(a) & 18 of the Security Exchange Act of
1934,'133 liability under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 may still
concern committee members."M In addition to "saddl[ing boards]
with very complex regulation and disclosure of executive compensation," the rule changes may create a fear of liability that would
drive companies to motivate executives through the rigid government-advocated performance system.' 3 If the package appears to
be performance-based, shareholders may trust that benefits will accrue to them and become lax in any supervisory role they otherwise would have undertaken.
IV. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE-A LOOK BEYOND
THE SYMPTOM TO THE PROBLEM

In a corporation, unlike in a sole proprietorship or even a
partnership, the link between ownership and control is severed. 36
129. Id. § 229.4020).
130. E.g., id. § 229.402(b), (1). A summary compensation table requires that a company display an itemization of the remuneration paid to the CEO and the four highest paid
company officers. This figure could be displayed previously as an aggregate number. Id. §
229.402(b). The information must contain a performance graph that compares in linear
form the company to an accepted index. Ld. § 229.402(l).
131. Ragsdale, supra note 72, at 564; Patrick J. Straka, Executive Compensation Disclosure: The SEC's Attempt to Facilitate Market Forces, 72 NEB. L. REv. 803, 834-35.
132. 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(k)(3) (1994).
133. Id. § 229.402(a)(9). The SEC's issuing remarks noted: "If shareholders are not
satisfied with the decisions reflected in the report, the proper response is the ballot, not
resort to the courts to challenge the disclosure." Executive Compensation Disclosure, 57
Fed. Reg. 48,126, 48,138 (1992) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 228, 229, 240, 249).
134. Straka, supra note 131, at 831-32.
135. Karmel, supra note 116, at 3.
136. Wesley R. Liebtag, Compensating Executives: The Development of Responsible
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While the corporation's equity is owned by the shareholders, managers act as agents for the shareholders and make decisions governing the company's daily operations. Obviously, the views and
desires of the principal and the agent may differ. Compensation
and control of management behavior become simple, yet pervasive,
difficulties inherent in this agency relationship.137 Pay-for-performance compensation packages move pay reform, at least in theory,
in the correct direction by attempting to realign the interests of
management and shareholders through the tailoring of management's compensation to specific corporate measures. 13 The lack
of ownership by corporate management, however, is an imperfection that remains inadequately addressed in the corporate structure, the market, and the judicial system. The most effective answer to the agency problem may be simply ownership itself. A nontransferable long-term equity ownership in the corporate enterprise
would prove beneficial to the operation of American businesses
because shareholder and management interests would be inextricably connected. 39 Ownership "prevents top corporate executives
from walking away from a losing game for shareholders without
'
losing something themselves. '""W
The current lack of management
equity holdings leads to poor internal decisionmaking in the corporation.Y A significant proprietary interest would ensure that any
rise or fall in long-term corporate fortunes would be felt by managers.
Artificially constructed pay substitutes for ownership, however,
can distort incentives and become subject to manipulation themselves. High pay from compensation packages does not necessarily

Management, in EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, supra note 32, at 27, 27.
137. Richard A. Lambert & David F. Larcker, Executive Compensation, Corporate
Decision Making, and Shareholder Wealth: A Review of the Evidence, in EXECUTIVE
COMPENSATION, supra note 32, at 98, 100-01; Charles M. Yablon, Overcompensating: The
Corporate Lawyer and Executive Pay, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1867, 1875 n.20 (1992).

138. E.g., Jensen & Murphy, supra note 19, at 149; Lambert & Larker, supra note
137, at 101. Compensation may be used to overcome differences in attitudes toward corporate risk and time horizons. Id.
139. Geoffrey Colvin, How to Pay the CEO Right, FORTUNE, Apr. 6, 1992, at 60, 68.
140. Kenneth Mason, Four Ways to Overpay Yourself Enough, in EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, supra note 32, at 263, 271; see also Porter, supra note 46, at 76. Reform

should focus on the creation of "a system in which managers will make investments that
maximize the long-term value of their companies." Id.
141. See Michael Jensen, The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of.
the Internal Control System, 48 J. FIN. 831, 864 (1993) (proposing increases in both management and director investment in the company).
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indicate corresponding increases in long-term corporate value and
may actually harm the company. The ownership ideal is often lost
in the final product emanating from the current executive compensation setting process. In fact, the pay-setting environment lends
itself to potentially abusive transactions and less than efficient
results, and the efforts of shareholders and the courts fail to alleviate the corporate governance ills.
A. Pay-Setting Environment
The theory of corporate governance is clear. Necessity dictates
that someone must set the pay of corporate executives. In the ideal corporate environment, the shareholders elect directors, the
directors choose executives, and executives handle the daily affairs
of the corporation.142 Directors are responsible for the creation
of executive pay packages; their fiduciary duty runs to shareholders.'43 They act as proxies for the shareholders' interests in all
decisions regarding the hiring and subsequent compensation of upper-level management. Therefore, directors should be held accountable for any mistakes made in setting compensation. If shareholders dislike compensation decisions, they should oust the directors and thus confine executive pay to appropriate levels.
In reality, compensation decisions of chief executives do not
follow the ideal corporate governance model and occur in an environment that lends itself to self-dealing.'" While bearing the responsibility for compensation, the directors have a naturally existing business relationship with the executives, were probably recommended for appointment to the directorship as a result of executive efforts, and may even be company executives that jointly
serve as directors. Gratitude for their lucrative employment opportunity creates a type of "chicken or the egg" phenomenon which
breeds loyalty to management and passivity among directors who
become the corporate officer's "lapdog, not the owners' watch-

142.

See Walter

. Salmon, Crisis Prevention: How to Gear Up Your Board, HARV.

Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 68 (outlining the two "crucial" functions of the board as
corporate oversight and the compensation, selection, and evaluation of management).
143. E.g., Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963).

144. See Samuel J.Silberman, CEO and Board Compensation Committee Concerns: A
Personal View, in EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, supra note 32, at 347, 347 (describing the

compensation decisions as the "most sensitive intersection of board and management roles
and responsibilities").
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dog."'45 According to a 1993 Korn/Ferry survey, director pay averages $33,133 and can range as high as $60,000 for the director's
two weeks of yearly service. 6 Few individuals would intentionally risk displeasing the person responsible for their participation in
such a prestigious and economically rewarding part-time activity.
When corporate officers are also directors, their advice can
carry a good deal of influence on the board. Thus, officers serving
as directors often dominate the boardroom environment. 147 On
the other hand, directors who are not corporate officers serve for
only a few weeks 'per year for a short overall tenure, often come
from completely unrelated business backgrounds, lack a private
personal staff, and sometimes split their time between the boards
of several corporations.'" The advice of executives on the board,
who are more familiar with the intricacies of the business and
have access to corporate information, may often be heeded by the
board in all of its decisions. In the vast majority of American
public corporations, the chairman of the board is also the CEO of
the company. 49 This American practice, in which less than 20%
of public corporations separate the two roles, stands in stark contrast to foreign countries such as Britain where a full 70% of
public companies utilize different individuals for these positions.' The powerful joint position can harm corporate governance.'' CEOs may use their influence to appoint personal
friends or individuals supportive of their positions to directorships. 5 Survey results found that 89% of the companies questioned depend on the chairman's recommendation in selection of

145. Bogus, supra note 42, at 38; see also Porter, supra note 46, at 76 (noting that
systemic pressures lead "objective" directors to side with management).

146. Salmon, supra note 142, at 74. Directorships make an especially attractive retirement activity for some people. Arch Patton, Those Million-Dollar-a-Year-Executives, in
ExEcu ivE COMPENSATION, supra note 32, at 43, 50.

147. Salmon, supra note 142, at 69. Corporate observers suggest limiting their numbers. Id. (proposing that there be only three representatives: the CEO, the Chief Operations Officer (COO), and the Chief Financial Officer (CFO)).

148. Crystal, supra note 32, at 226; Patton, supra note 146, at 49-51,
149. Jay W. Lorsch & Martin Lipton, On the Leading Edge: The Lead Director,
HARV. Bus. REv., Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 76.
150. Id.

151. See Jensen, supra note 141, at 866 (noting that a consolidation of authority combined with an unwieldy board of more than eight members allows management to make
inefficient decisions).
152.

CRYSTAL, supra note 39, at 226.
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directors.' The joint CEO-chairman role thus allows executives
to control the agenda-setting power and to substantially control
the board's discussion and operations.
In practice, some attempts are made to counter the self-dealing nature of executive compensation decisions. Eighty-four to
99% of large companies form compensation committees to establish executive pay. Companies try to fill committees with the
directors who have the least amount of outside ties to the executives, which means for the most part that the directors selected are
not corporate employees.'55 The primary motivation for employing outside directors on the compensation committee is the limitation of liability for the entire board because the law affords certain protection to decisions ratified by disinterested directors. 56
Independent pay consultants propose the specific plans. The executives may also be represented by their own negotiators in dealings
with the committee.
Yet, these safeguards only restrict egregious procedural abuses. Even "disinterested" committee members have incentives to
favor upper-level management since the directors must deal personally with the same officers throughout their respective tenures
on the board. In addition, although "ostensibly being hired by a
company's shareholders," executives usually select the actual pay
consultants.
Consultants recognize who effectively wields the
power to hire them and understand that pleasing the corporate officers may allow them to return for the next opportunity to set
executive pay. For corporate boards, assuming that outside-pay
consultants are independent can be a serious mistake.5 8
Another problem may be created by the fact that executive
pay consultants represent a societal subgroup accustomed to a
norm of incredibly high salaries.'59 The pay consultants, equipped

with their comparison surveys of other top executive pay, present
a persuasive argument to most self-respecting directors who cer-

153. Salmon,
note 142, at 71.
154. James W. Fisher, Jr.,
note 32, at 366, 366.
COMPENSATION,
155. Barrs,
note 20, at 75.
157.

158.

CRYSTAL,

note 39, at 220.

EXECU-

Graef S. Crystal,

TIVE COMPENSATION,

159. Barrs,

EXECUTIVE

note 32, at 353, 364-65.

note 20, at 77.
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tainly do not want to pay their CEO less than the mean compensation for other high quality business talent. The result is constant
upward pressure on pay levels.'" The inflationary impact on pay
levels leads analysts to frequently urge compensation committees
to refrain from engaging in a "parallel the market strategy."''
Executives can become the company's trophy. Unfamiliarity with
the corporation, combined with time and resource constraints, restrict the directors' ability to establish pay packages and select
adequate corporate measures upon which to gauge pay properly.
In fact, directors may be using their own compensation as a reference point for management pay. Although the size of the firm itself could be the best determinant of executive pay levels, studies
regularly find that executive compensation varies with the level of
director pay. 62 Movements of the two levels of compensation
bear a sort of "incestuous" relationship.'63 Since many chief executives also serve on the boards and compensation committees of
other companies, they can provide a unique mutual "backscratching" environment for each other's pay.164
The process results in a lack of an "arm's length" bargaining
environment, which merely adds to the controversy surrounding
executive pay. Any comparisons in pay level with other members
of society seem inappropriate. 6 5 Executives, unlike other highly
paid professionals such as athletes and performers, cannot demonstrate market mechanisms that help establish their compensation
when they sit down with their agents to negotiate at arm's length.

160. CEO Pay: How Much Is Enough?, supra note 41, at 136.
161. Fisher, supra note 154, at 375.
162. E.g., Charles O'Reilly et al., CEO Compensation as Tournament and Social Comparison: A Tale of Two Theories, 33 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 257 (1988) (finding greater correlation between CEO compensation and that of outside directors, especially compensation
committee members, than between CEO compensation and size or performance indicators). But see Peter F. Kostivik, Firm Size and Executive Compensation, 25 J.HUM. RESOURCES 90 (1990) (utilizing firm size as a successful determinant of the level of execu-

tive income).
163. CRYSTAL, supra note 39, at 230.
164. Thomas McCarroll, Executive Pay: The Shareholders Strike Back, TIME, May 4,
1992, at 46, 47-48 ("It's a cozy you-scratch-my-back-I'll-scratch-yours arrangement ....
[CEOs] don't want Mother Theresa or the Sisters of Charity on [their] compensation

committee.").
165. CRYSTAL, supra note 39, at 31-41 (focusing on examples of sports figures, partners in law firms, and investment bankers). Some analysts propose solutions to try to
make the executive pay-setting process more like that of other individuals. E.g., Martin,
supra note 19, at 238-39 (advocating efforts to set CEO pay at arm's length like everyone else who "work[s] for a living," rather than as the "family business' favored child").

1995]

PERFORMANCE COMPENSATION

In other professions, high-pay levels may be legitimized by the
genuine bargaining efforts that accompany their attainment. Additionally, unlike the majority of the workforce, high-level management does not face a true threat of dismissal. The firm-specific
knowledge demanded in the chief executive's job ensures that
most top managers will usually rise from within the company's
ranks. Several studies have found a lack of cross-firm mobility
within the market for CEOs and an average tenure of twenty-four
years for top executives.' 66 The requirement of corporate familiarity reduces the available talent pool for the CEO position and
only can increase the general reluctance of directors to replace
their chief officers.
Although boards possess the power to do so, they rarely dismiss CEOs for purely performance reasons. 67 Director relationships with management and a lack of adequate successors have led
some companies, such as USAir, to retain their CEOs despite continued financial floundering.'" When a board actually removes
the CEO for poor performance, the action might be too late since
significant harm often has already been done to the corporation.' 6 In addition, the CEO terminations that do occur may be
largely independent of performance. Boards even remove some
chief executives despite the company's financial success and the
officer's reputation in the business community as a "laudable example of corporate management."' 7 Most CEOs, however, enjoy
166. E.g., Kostivik, supra note 162, at 104.
167. Jensen & Murphy, supra note 19, at 142 (noting research that only 20 of 500
management changes studied were performance-based terminations); Joann S. Lublin &
Christina Duff, Management How Do You Fire a CEO? Very, Very Slowly, WALL ST. J.,

Jan. 20, 1995, at B1 (citing nationwide boardroom "reluctance to fire" chief executives).
168. Lublin & Duff, supra note 167, at B1 (remarking that USAir, which has not had
a profitable year since 1989, suffered 1994 losses in excess of "1993's $350 million").
Some particularly dismal performances result in dismissal, as in the case of Interleaf,
where a year of slumping sales followed by more than a 29% single-quarter "nose-dive"
in volume led the board to believe "it had to take action." Interleaf Loses $8 Million,
Ousts Ruport as CEO, SEYBOLD REPORT ON PUBLISHING SYSTEMS, Aug. 9, 1994, at 39.

Ethically questionable behavior can also lead to a CEO's ouster. E.g., Joan E. Rigdon,
Fatal Blunder: Genentech CEO, a Man Used to Pushing the Limit, Exceeds It and Is Out,
WALL ST. J., July 11, 1995, at Al, A6. Often the poorly performing CEOs who face dis-

missal are especially high profile figures. Morrison Knudsen's dismissal of William Agee
upon the report of the company's $150 million fourth quarter loss in February 1995 ex-

emplifies board actions taken against celebrated chief executives. Rigdon & Lublin, supra
note 87, at B1, B4.

169. Lublin & Duff, supra note 167, at B1; see also Jensen, supra note 141, at 863.
170. Sunbeam CEO Fired, Partners Sue, WORLD NEwS DIG., Feb. 25, 1993, at 118-A2;
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a lengthy average tenure with a minimal termination risk. One
study showed that the average CEO has already been in office 6.5
years, and other studies have shown that the typical CEO will act
as chief executive for a total of ten years.'71 CEOs in companies
enjoying the best performance face a 3% chance of termination
while those in the worst merely have a 6% risk.7 The net effect
is that chief executives are thoroughly, and perhaps inextricably,
engaged in their influential positions and in the process of the
development of their own compensation.
B. ShareholderInfluence Through Self-Help Remedies
One might expect restraints on pay to come from downward
pressure on share price through the market transactions of dissatisfied shareholders. In any decision, shareholders have the right to
utilize the Wall Street Rule and "vote with their feet." '73 Yet,
the alternative of selling their stock may not be of much assistance
to those institutional investors who maintain indexed portfolios and
cannot afford to sell their shares without significantly harming
their overall diversification strategies.174 Due to the large concentration of the country's capital in the holdings of institutional investors,'75 the sale option plays less than its potential role in the
modem market. Furthermore, high transaction costs and a negative
impact on the corporation that may not clearly manifest itself can
also dissuade investors with smaller portfolios from action in compensation matters.
The somewhat illiquid interest of an institutional investor in a
corporation, however, may create enough incentive for the shareholder to seek to influence corporate policy. Investors possess
several options to indicate their preference in the company's decisee also Amy Feldman, Position Wanted, FORBES, Feb. 28, 1994, at 16 (describing dismissal of CEO of Andes Candies on the same day that Forbes complimented her for
"turning around" the company).
171. Anders, supra note 1, at 81.

172. Jensen & Murphy, supra note 19, at 142.
173. Martin, supra note 19, at 239.
174. See Robert C. Pozen, Institutional Investors: The Reluctant Activists, HARV. Bus.

REV., Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 140, 147. The California Public Employees Retirement System
(CaIPERS), for example, maintains a highly indexed portfolio with a single largest 1990
holding of merely .71% of a particular company's equity. Porter, supra note 46, at 69.
175. Straka, supra note 131, at 807-08; Michael Siconolfi, Individual Investors' Holdings of U.S. Stocks Fall Below 50%

Nov. 13, 1992, at C1.

of Total Market for the First Time, WALL ST. J.,
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sions, such as engaging in proxy fights, proposing shareholder
resolutions, and communicating with the corporation. 6 An institutional investor represents a consolidated voting block of corporate authority. Negotiations backed by the threat of a vote have
the potential for profound impact on corporate policy decisions.
Large private investors, such as Kirk Kerkorian, and their influence on the operations of some of America's largest corporations
offer examples of investor power short of any vote or sale of
stock. Although Kerkorian does not maintain a controlling interest
in Chrysler's equity, his- constant pressure forced the company to
"share the cash stockpile it [had] been amassing" by raising its
dividend 60%, repurchasing one billion dollars of stock, and lowering a poison pill defense.' The same type of shareholder pressure can be seen in the efforts of the New York City pension fund
and other institutional investors to force RJR Nabisco to separate
its food and tobacco businesses. 8 Some analysts believe that institutional investors offer the "best available watchdog" for corporate governance. 79 SEC policy on executive compensation matters certainly focuses on shareholder influence as the proper method of addressing the issue. 80
Notwithstanding the SEC's faith in shareholders, many analysts question the net effects of shareholder influence on business
given the shareholder's lack of long-term focus and management
experience.' A few of the nation's largest institutional investors
have acted on compensation issues.'" However, little shareholder

176.

Pozen, supra note 174, at 146-47.

177. See Neal Templin & Nichole M. Christian, Chrysler Boosts Dividend, Sets
Buyback of Stock in Effort to Mollify Kerkorian, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 1994, at A3.

178. Glenn Collins, New Pressures on Philip Morris, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1994, at
Cl; cf. Arthur M. Louis, Struggling Real Estate Developer Fires CEO, S.F. CHRON., Feb.

15, 1994, at D1 (discussing similar influence exercised by CalPERS at Eastman Kodak,
General Motors, IBM, and Catellus Development Corp.); Michael J. McCarthy, UAL
Reaches New Agreement on Buyout Plan, WALL ST. J., May 23, 1994, at A3 (noting role

of institutional investors in negotiation of terms of the airline's employee buyout).
179. Barrs, supra note 20, at 100; see also Dale M. Hanson, The Bureaucrats Strike

Back, HARV. Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 78 (claiming that institutional investors can,
and do, examine performance statistics over the longterm) (author is CEO of CalPERS).

180. See supra text accompanying notes 117-35.
181. E.g., Porter, supra note 46, at 67-68 (expressing concern with the short-term
horizons of all American investors); Charles Wohlstetter, Pension Fund Socialism: Can
Bureaucrats Run the Blue Chips, HARV. Bus. REv., Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 78 (noting the lack

of pension fund employees with a "background in major corporate management").
182. In recent years, CalPERS actions have targeted such companies as ITI, UAL,
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activity has occurred overall with respect to executive compensation issues. In fact, when issues of all subject matter are considered, even the "outspoken" CalPERS becomes involved in less
than thirty companies per year.183 In order to satisfy their fiduciary duties to investors, institutional owners weigh the costs of
activism against the potential benefits."8 Monitoring a particular
company's compensation decisions can be costly and difficult for
institutional investors.'8 Moreover, since compensation decisions
normally do not present a clearly negative impact on its diversified
holdings, an institutional investor is much more likely to focus its
resources on its investment strategy: "The reality is that it's very
difficult for even a large institutional investor to develop the resources to go into every issue."' 8 6 In addition, involving shareholders more directly in the initial process of compensation may
not produce the best results. Shareholder influences in the pay-setting process could lead to unnecessary confusion of policies and to
shareholder and SEC micromanagement of executive-compensation
decisions." An efficient and beneficial compensation policy
could be developed through the mere shareholder threat of a genuine post-decision review of board actions in the pursuit of a legal
remedy. Unfortunately, derivative legal action has not proven an
effective influence on compensation practices.

General Dynamics, and Fairchild. See Brownstein & Panner, supra note 17, at 34;
Yablon, supra note 137, at 1889-90 n.61. Other pension funds such as those run by New
York City and Wisconsin have also addressed compensation issues. CEO Pay: How Much

Is Enough?, supra note 41, at 139 (describing shareholder resolution filed by New York
City Employees Retirement System to limit the membership of compensation committee
at Reebok International to outside directors); Pozen, supra note 174, at 145 (outlining efforts of State of Wisconsin Pension Board to convince shareholders to withhold votes for
compensation committee at Paramount Communications).
183.

Pozen, supra note 174, at 147.

184. Id. at 141.
185. Yablon, supra note 137, at 1892.
186. Lauren Young, The Owner Mentality, WALL ST. J., Apr. 12, 1995, at R12 (quoting Philip Halpern, Chief Investment Officer for the Washington State Investment Board).
187. Martin, supra note 19, at 253. Courts may strike down SEC micromanagement
and certain "shadings within the notion of 'management"' Business Roundtable v. SEC,
905 F.2d 406, 411 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (ruling against the SEC's authority to mandate a one
share-one vote requirement for stock).
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C. Shareholder Influence Through Derivative Legal Action
In theory, shareholders may enforce their fiduciary duty rights
through legal action. Given the ineffectiveness of the corporate
model itself and the self-help mechanisms, legal liability may constitute the only motivation for corporate actions. The current influence of legal action, however, is limited. In attempts to pursue a
judicial remedy, shareholders face procedural challenges within a
court system that offers high levels of protection to compensation
decisions."M The protection of the board's decisions is two-fold:
Plaintiffs must overcome the initial hurdle of the demand requirement only to face the second obstacle of the business judgment
rule.
Since a shareholder's injury is derivative in nature, the plaintiff must bring suit in the corporation's name. Procedure dictates
that the shareholder make a demand on the corporation's directors
to rectify the situation.'89 The procedural demand issue can dictate the outcome of the substantive issues in the case. Generally,
the only instance in which demand can be overcome is when demand is excused under the futility exception because of a transparent self-dealing environment. 9 Plaintiffs need to demonstrate
more than just the mere fact that the decisionmakers were elected
and serve at the behest of individuals who control the outcome of
corporate elections, especially since directors may accept management input into their. decisions.' 9' If the compensation plan has
been ratified by disinterested directors, excusal of demand will be
highly unlikely. Because the decision to excuse demand is determined at the time of the filing of the complaint, plaintiffs do not
benefit from full discovery, further adding to the difficulty of their
task.' 92
Once past the demand stage, the shareholder must face the
second obstacle of the business judgment protection, regardless of
the theory on which the claim is based. 93 The shareholder claim
188. Martin, supra note 19, at 243-44.
189. E.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811-12 (Del. 1984).
190. Id. at 814.
191. Id. at 814-15.
192. 2 JAMES D. COX ET. AL, CORPORATIONS § 15.7, at 15.62 (1995).
193. E.g., International Ins. Co. v. Johns, 874 F.2d 1447, 1458-61 (11th Cir. 1989)
(articulating principle of the business judgment rule under which the board of directors
maintains broad discretion over business decisions and enjoys the presumption that the
directors behaved properly and in good faith).

170
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may proceed on either a theory of fiduciary duty violation or one
of corporate waste. 94 Fiduciary duty consists of a two-part director duty: a duty of loyalty and a duty of care. Compensation decisions do not clearly violate the loyalty aspect of the fiduciary duty.
Although officer compensation contains self-dealing elements, a
court may not view such decisions as expressly implicating the
duty of loyalty. 95 Shareholders may hope these aspects of selfdealing, taken in conjunction with the second element of the fiduciary duty (i.e., the directors' care requirement), will offer them
some relief. A successful attack of a pay decision, however, is also
unlikely since the business judgment rule applies to protect the
compensation selections of the corporation.'96
Under the fiduciary duty concept, an executive compensation
decision is considered a routine business transaction. Procedural requirements of the directors to satisfy business judgment protections
with regard to compensation decisions remain relatively low compared with those applicable to such fundamental transactions as
mergers and consolidations."9 If directors employ the usual process of purportedly disinterested compensation committees, the
compensation decision will have to be shown to be devoid of any
rational basis in order to establish liability. 9 ' Plaintiffs face a
"Herculean" labor and rarely succeed in overcoming this high
standard.' 99

194. See, e.g., id.; Cohen v. Ayers, 596 F.2d 733, 739 (7th Cir. 1979); Michelson v.
Duncan, 407 A.2d 211, 216-17 (Del. 1979); Wilderman v. Wilderman, 315 A.2d 610, 615
(Del. 1974); Beard v. Elster, 160 A.2d 731 (Del. 1960); see also John F. Olson et al.,
The Board Compensation Committee Report on Executive Compensation: The Effect on the
State Law Fiduciary Duty of Directors, in EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION REPORTING, supra
note 97, at 305, 308-14 (1993).
195. See, e.g., Cohen, 596 F.2d at 739-40 (focusing analysis on loyalty effect upon burden of proof for the care duty).
196. See, e.g., International Ins. Co., 874 F.2d at 1461; Freedman v. Barrow, 427 F.
Supp. 1129, 1155 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Haber v. Bell, 465 A.2d 353, 357 (Del. Ch. 1983).
197. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 874 (Del. 1985) (requiring directors to
become informed in merger transaction). Unlike a case involving fundamental transactions, there is a long tradition of executive compensation issues being within the
"business and affairs" of the corporation managed by the board. Id. at 872. See also
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 955 (Del. 1985) (noting that in
creating a takeover defense, board's decision must be "reasonable in relation to the
threat posed").
198. Yablon, supra note 137, at 1883; Olson et al., supra note 194, at 311-14.
199. Bogus, supra note 42, at 22; see also Cohen, 596 F.2d at 738-39 (approving an
option repricing); Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 627 (Del. 1984) (upholding stock option plan adopted by a majority of disinterested directors); Beard v. Elster, 160 A.2d 731,

1995]

PERFORMANCE COMPENSATION

Alternatively, a shareholder may sue under a corporate waste
theory. The shareholder must demonstrate that the company failed
to receive reasonable consideration for the resources it expended.

Even slight consideration will justify the directors' compen-

sation decisions,"' and the reasonableness requirement can be
met easily if the board purports to award the compensation pay-

ments for an appropriate purpose such as to reward and retain the
executives.' Only the most egregious compensation relationships
will be prohibited.

3

Shareholders have had little success in over-

coming the minimal consideration standard.2 ' As a result, when
the company receives some type of consideration, the directors

rely on the advice of compensation experts, and a committee of
outside board members approves the package; thus, pay decisions
enjoy near complete insulation from the legal actions that could
compensate for the structural deficiencies in the executive pay
determination process.!

Given the imperfections of the pay-setting environment and
the futility of self-help and legal actions, shareholders have few

effective avenues for remedying perceived excessive compensation.
Ownership interests have diverged from those of management, and

738 (Del. 1960) (protecting option plan approved by disinterested directors).
200. Saxe v. Brady, 184 A.2d 602, 610 (Del. Ch. 1962) (outlining the classic test for
corporate waste as the receipt of consideration "so inadequate in value that no person'of
ordinary, sound business judgment would deem it worth what the corporation has paid").
201. Heller v. Boylan, 29 N.Y.S.2d 653, 680 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1941).
202. BarNs, supra note 20, at 81, 84 (finding few cases and less analysis relating to instances of corporate waste in compensation payments where some service was rendered).
203. See Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 591-92 (1933) ("If a bonus payment has no
relation to the value of services for which it is given, it is in reality a gift in part and
the majority stockholders have no power to give away corporate property against the
protest of the minority." (quoting Rogers v. Hill, 60 F.2d 109, 113-14 (2d Cir. 1932)
(Swan, J., dissenting)). Bonuses will not be permitted when they are "so large as in
substance and effect to amount to spoliation or waste of corporate property." Rogers, 289
U.S. at 591.
204. E.g., International Ins. Co. v. Johns, 874 F.2d 1447, 1469 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding incentive plan not to constitute waste because it encouraged workers to remain with
company and continue to act in its best interests); Cohen v. Ayers, 596 F.2d 733, 739
(7th Cir. 1979) (finding the decision of consideration adequacy for a stock option repricing within the "sound business judgment of the corporation's directors"); Pogostin v.
Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 626 (Del. 1984) (upholding stock option plan as some benefit had
accrued); Olsen Brothers Inc. v. Englehardt, 245 A.2d 166, 168 (Del. 1968). But see Rogers, 289 U.S. at 582 (holding generous, 20-year-old bonus formula to constitute waste);
Kerbs v. California Eastern Airways, 90 A.2d 652, 657 (Del. 1952) (striking certain stock
options that had no continued employment requirement and no vesting period).
205. Barris, supra note 20, at 86.
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the operation of the corporate model has not succeeded in realigning them. Managers do not think like long-term proprietors. Moreover, they have no economic incentive to do so because compensation may be set in a self-dealing environment largely free from
shareholder repercussions. The problem is clear: Corporate governance has failed in this respect.
V. PROPOSAL-THE SOLUTION OF
OWNERSHIP AND JUDICIAL REVIEW

As the business world copes with the issues of executive compensation, focus must shift from the symptom to the underlying
corporate governance problem. Current pay-for-performance programs should be revised because the problem demands a flexible
implementation derived from the ideals of true long-term ownership. Regulatory entities must refrain from pushing a bureaucratic
performance solution; rather, they should allow a sufficient judicial
forum and legal incentive for reform. The floodgates of litigation
need not be thrown open as a few key decisions could establish
standards that most corporations would follow. Moreover, by altering procedural protections in compensation cases, courts could allow actual analysis of certain pay decisions to ensure independence
of decisionmaking and the advancement of ownership interests.
A. An Ownership Basis
The federally advocated performance-based system attempts to
be a proxy for ownership, but artificial substitutes are not capable
of simulating true long-term ownership. Attempts to manipulate
managerial behavior by tying compensation to individual economic
indicators may fail and certainly will bring risks of added harm to
the corporation. Pay plans should be viewed for what they
are-compensation. The focus needs to shift from encouraging and
micromanaging certain aspects of performance to achieving true
long-term proprietary interests. Reform efforts should encourage
chief executives to own significant amounts of equity.26 Officers'
holdings should be restricted and not capable of transfer for an
extended period of time. The longer the executive's outlook is, the
better it will be for the company. The three to five-year limit on
transferability for any restricted stock options offered in today's
206. E.g., Brownstein & Panner, supra note 17, at 35.
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packages 7 should be lengthened to an absolute minimum of five
years. Multiple benefits would accrue by overcoming America's
problem of "transient ownership" and "linking pay more closely to
2 8 Indeed, the potential benefits
long-term company prosperity.""
of ownership can be seen in survey results that indicate that companies with above-median levels of stock ownership among their
chief executives enjoy higher returns than those of companies with
below-median ownership."°9 Ownership efforts should be expanded, and executives should be required to ride the corporate enterprise's rollercoaster of fortune. There can be no better way to
simulate a proprietary experience than to offer it. Purported performance plans may take a variety of forms, but ownership represents a basis against which such plans should be balanced. The
contribution to true long-term ownership interests would help to
provide an effective measurement.
Ownership plans might be initiated by forcing equity on executives at their initial engagement: "Putting one's own money at
'
stake seems like a sound approach to incentives."21
Indeed,
some companies, such as corporate takeover giant Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co. (KKR), have achieved positive results by asking top managers to purchase or hold a large proprietary interest
in their company. When KKR acquired Duracell in 1988, the company's management increased its holdings from 1% to 9.85%.2P
In the period following the acquisition. (1988 to 1992), company
performance caused Duracell's stock price to rise over $20 per
share.212 Some companies, such as Caterpillar Inc. and Coming
Inc., even "police their employees' holdings" and "penalize" executives who do not meet proper stock-ownership levels.213
Increased executive ownership could be achieved in a more
subtle manner through compensation. The specific form of long-

207.
208.

Lublin, supra note 28, at R4.
Porter, supra note 46, at 81.

209. Young, supra note 186, at R12.
210.

Dumaine, supra note 29, at 103. An executive may respond favorably to the

notion
Talks,
CEO,
CEOs

of a mandatory stock purchase in their company. E.g., Joann S. Lublin, Money
WALL ST. J., Apr. 12, 1995, at R10 (describing the situation of Scott Paper Co.'s
Albert J. Dunlop, an avid proponent of a stock purchase requirement for new
who bought $4 million of stock when asked by the company's board to purchase

$1 million worth).
211. Anders, supra note 1, at 80.
212. Id. at 81.
213. Young, supra note 186, at R12.
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term equity utilized in such situations may vary. For instance,
restricted stock grants with lengthy limitations on transferability
offer one method of encouraging a proprietary position. In the
alternative, corporations could offer stock options with reasonably
low exercise prices and extremely lengthy vesting periods. Options
represent relatively inexpensive proprietary substitutes when appropriately set to discourage short-term risk-taking and to allow rewards for steady long-term growth. Some critics fear that options
offer incentives for executives to engage in potentially detrimental
14
behavior to induce a rise in stock price above strike price.
These risks, however, can be largely eliminated by awarding options that should return a payoff through merely moderate growth
and by allowing sufficient vesting time in order to avoid any attempts at short-term inflation of share price. Excessive managerial
risk usually will not constitute a problem as executives retain more
of a 15stake in a particular company than do diversified inves2
tors.
Similarly, the cost to the corporation of such compensation
through the dilution of equity need not be large, notwithstanding
the claims of certain critics.216 Executives must be paid in some
form of compensation. Companies might as well compensate them
in a manner that provides some return to the corporate enterprise.
Managers who focus on the improvement of long-term corporate
stock price will rapidly counter any dilutionary effects of options
or additional equity allocations and outstrip the market cost of
treasury share transfers as benefits accrue to all shareholders.
Take, for example, the situation at Panhandle Eastern Corp., a
company that has elected to compensate its CEO and chairman,
Dennis R. Hendrix, entirely in stock.217 Although Mr. Hendrix's
holdings had increased to 389,000 shares with a market value of
nine million dollars as of April 1995, the firm's stock price had
more than doubled from $11 to $23 million since he joined the
company in 1990.218 Shareholders will have difficulty finding fault

in the level of the CEO's holdings when they continue to enjoy
such returns.
214.

E.g., CRYSTAL, supra note 39, at 71.

215. See supra text accompanying notes 99-100.
216. Andrew E. Serwer, Executive Pay: The Big Hangover in Stock Options, FORTUNE, July 24, 1995 at 28.

217. Young, supra note 186, at R12.
218. Id.

1995]

PERFORMANCE COMPENSATION

Under this proposed method, the executive would be offered
a fixed salary absent performance indicators for the remaining portion of compensation, thereby removing incentives to manipulate
measures and harm the corporation. Executives could elect to receive all compensation as a guaranteed salary. The long-term incentives, however, should be offered at beneficial returns to make
them attractive and to encourage the executive to take a sizable
portion of compensation in this form. The salary allows the executive to receive his risk-free worth, but the long-term ownership
offers much larger rewards. If an executive truly believed in his
personal abilities, he would elect to receive compensation in the
form of higher potential long-term returns. In order to reap the
largest possible reward, executives would have to focus on the
long-term success of the corporation.
Since attracting and retaining talented executives can be problematic, especially in a system with large amounts of uncertain
payoffs, the potential benefits of risk must outweigh the perceived
costs of risk. Yet, as more than 70% of CEOs rise from within
corporate ranks, offering especially attractive CEO compensation
may not be as important to the firm as one might initially believe.219 Indeed, given the firm-specific nature of the CEO labor
market, creating strong incentives to prevent corporate leaders
from "being pirated by another company" may not be necessary.' The retention argument may be just another excuse to
justify overpayment of top level management." As one critic
noted, certain corporate leaders such as "Jack Welch can get another job," but "[m]ost CEOs can't."'
B. Judicial Implementation in Lieu of Federal Advocacy
The corporate governance problem should be addressed
through standards established in a judicial forum rather than those
dictated by federal regulators. Some reformists have already recognized the potential benefits offered by judicial analysis.
Only
judicial remedies possess the necessary flexible approach that can

219.

BOK, supra note 14, at 105.

220. Id.
221. Lublin, supra note 28, at R4.
222. Id. (quoting Stanford University Law Professor and former SEC Commissioner
Joseph Grundfest).
223. E.g., Barns, supra note 20, at 87-88; Yablon, supra note 137, at 1906.
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encourage individual innovation and freedom in the implementation of compensation matters while simultaneously preventing abuses and addressing the problem of setting pay in the corporate environment. An adversarial process complete with an opportunity
for discovery 4 would prove beneficial in establishing standards
that ensure genuine independence in the compensation process and
the promotion of ownership interests. In a judicial forum, the
compensation plan of the top executives and the decisionmaking
process can be analyzed and debated rather than summarily penalized through tax laws and disclosure regulations. Moreover, a chilling effect will not override compensation innovation. If a corporation genuinely believes in its compensation scheme, it can elect to
compensate executives in such a manner and, if necessary, defend
its scheme in court.
Contrary to current practice, regulatory entities should refrain
from advocating any type of compensation system. Notwithstanding
the proposals by some critics of the current system that federal
incentives must merely encourage a different particular method of
compensation, Congress and the SEC are not charged with dictating the direction of corporate governance in America. In addition, the country's limited federal resources
should not be
wasted on the development of "bureaucratic" ' solutions that do
not resolve effectively problems of business strategy. Federally
mandated approaches are too restrictive.' Corporations employ
many creative individuals who may design innovative compensation
schemes appropriate for their organizations. Who is to say that all
such compensation must function on a performance basis? Instead,
corporations should be encouraged to apply their own choices of
compensation policy, within certain reasonable parameters, such as
the prohibition of managerial self-dealing plans.
Congress and the SEC should follow the example of restraint
established by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB),

224. See supra text accompanying note 192.
225. E.g., CRYSTAL, supra note 39, at 249-51 (suggesting tax-based motivation for
certain restricted options with 10-year vesting periods).
226. The SEC, for example, has recently operated with only two of five commissioners, creating an understaffing situation which significantly taxes the Commission's ability
to address major issues and creates certain delay. Mark H. Anderson, SEC Members
Now Count Only Two, WALL ST. J., July 17, 1995, at B4A.
227. Karmel, supra note 116, at 7.

228. See Yablon, supra note 137, at 1889-90.
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another regulatory entity that had the opportunity to enter the
executive compensation debate. In June 1993, FASB addressed the
executive compensation issue through the drafting of a proposal to
change the accounting method for stock options. 9 Altering the
accounting standards for options, which constitute an important
tool for the advancement of ownership interests, would have lowered reported earnings for companies that utilize options as a
compensation method. The proposed mandatory earnings charge
would have greatly limited the use of options as a method of compensation, especially in smaller high-technology firms in which
options often constitute a sizable portion of the pay of all employees. After a lengthy debate that was analogized to the public
controversies over "NAFTA, healthcare reform, and the designated
hitter [rule],"' FASB has resigned itself to footnote disclosure,
a minor rule change that represents a substantial retreat from the
position the Board staked out in the exposure draft."2 Following
FASB's lead, Congress and the SEC should not advocate any particular compensation plan but instead should allow the investing
community to negotiate the appropriate standards for the pay decisions through the judicial forum.
The true merit of the reforms arise, however, from the deterrent effect that genuine judicial analysis would provide. The legitimate threat of post hoc legal action would correctly guide boards
and executives through the corporate decisionmaking process. In
addition, the disruptive effects of shareholder involvement in the
initial compensation decisions could be avoided. Ideally, little extra
litigation would actually be necessary. Corporate counsel merely
could alert management to the litigation risk in compensation
decisions to ensure a fully informed, fair process'

229. FASB,

PROPOSED STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS,

Ac-

COUNTING FOR STOCK-BASED COMPENSATION, (June 30, 1993), reprinted in EXECUTIVE

supra note 97, at 403.
230. Dumaine, supra note 29, at 103; George Sollman, Debate: CEO Pay: How Much
is Enough?, HARV. BUS. REv., July-Aug. 1992, at 130, 137; 140 Cong. Rec. S14,507,
14,509 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1994) (statement by Sen. Lieberman).
231. Jay Mathews, Panel Gets an Earful on Stock Options Rule, WASH. POST, Mar. 8,
1994, at C2.
232. FASB to Issue Final Rule on Valuing Stock Options, WALL ST. J., July 28, 1995,
at A3; Lee Berton & Joann S. Lublin, FASB Softens Plan on Deducting Costs of Stock
Options, WALL ST. J., Dec. 15, 1994, at A2, A9.
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The court system was quite successful in developing appropriate standards of director behavior in response to the takeover
environment of the 1980s.' 4 The Delaware courts clarified business judgment standards in acquisition situations through a series
of decisions extending into the current decade." 5 Similar progress
could be made in compensation analysis. Although little effective
review of pay decisions occurs today, an adjustment in procedural
standards in the executive compensation area could lead to the establishment of effective guidance for pay decisions. If plaintiffs
faced more than a minuscule opportunity of success in their endeavors, the same judicial system that currently insulates potentially abusive compensation decisions actually cQuld act to curb them.
C. Setting the Standards with Independence and Yardsticks
Effective judicial review of executive compensation can be attained through an adjustment to procedure. The self-dealing nature
of pay decisions demands that courts examine such decisions more
thoroughly than other genuinely arm's length business actions. A
demand-like hearing involving certain minimal discovery rights and
a mini-review on the merits of the case would allow courts to establish the necessary standards in the executive compensation field.
Legitimate discovery rights would prevent shareholders from being
locked out of the courthouse merely because they lack a minimal
amount of compensation information. A summary examination of
the merits based upon a sufficiency standard would allow plaintiffs
with a genuine case to overcome the double procedural barriers of
demand and the business judgment rule. A plaintiff that cleared
the abbreviated review process would not need to overcome the
business judgment presumptions.
The judiciary is competent to handle a mini-merit review of
executive compensation issues. Compensation decisions are matters
of economics. By their very nature, they are much more objective
than the resolution of classic business issues such as whether base-

234. I. at 1898-99; e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (setting
standard of informed decision); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del.
1985) (requiring a reasonable relationship to threat).
235. See Paramount Communications v. QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1993); Paramount Communications v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990); Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986); Smith, 488 A.2d at 858;
Unocal, 493 A.2d at 946.
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ball should be played at nighttime 6 Full business judgment protection is not needed for compensation decisions nor is it merited
given the largely self-dealing environment in which compensation
decisions are set. Moreover, courts already conduct thorough reviews of compensation in certain tax cases 7 and those involving
close corporations.3' Review in executive compensation cases
need not even reach such a level.
A company's compensation decisions should be protected in
the mini-review process if they are delivered by truly independent
consultants or actually demonstrate the genuine proprietary interest that they claim to offer. Boards that still want to defer to
compensation consultants should be allowed to do so, notwithstanding all the upward biases and needless resource consumption
involved in their use. However, board members must not be allowed to rely blindly on the purported independence of such consultants. Self-dealing should be closely monitored. Consultants
certainly should not be commissioned by management. Limits and
firewalls must be established for recurring engagements. Although
a consultant may propose the scheme, the board must ultimately
bear the responsibility.
Some types of compensation itself should be sufficient to
withstand the mini-review and maintain the procedural protections.
The caveat, of course, would be that such compensation compares
favorably with the principle of genuine long-term ownership, and
courts need to engage in such a comparative analysis. Courts may
complain that they lack a "yardstick" by which to measure executive compensation. 9 However, such a yardstick exists in the
236. See Schlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968).
237. Courts consider many factors such as an employee's qualifications, the nature and
complexity of the business, and return on equity to determine whether compensation
qualifies as a "reasonable" expense entitled to deduction under I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) (1995).
E.g., RTS Investment Corp. v. Commissioner, 877 F.2d 647 (8th Cir. 1989); Rutter v.
Commissioner, 853 F.2d 1267 (5th Cir. 1988); Ownersby & Kritikos, Inc. v. Commissioner,
819 F.2d 1315 (5th Cir. 1987); Elliotts, Inc. v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 1241 (9th Cir.

1983); Kennedy v. Commissioner, 671 F.2d 167 (6th Cir. 1982); Mayson Manufacture Co.
v. Commissioner, 178 F.2d 115 (6th Cir. 1949); Pfeiffer Brewing Co. v. Commissioner, 11
T.C.M. (CCH) 586 (1952).
238. E.g., Cookies Food Products v. Lakes Warehouse Distributing, 430 N.W.2d 447

(Iowa 1988); Hingle v. Plaquemines Oil Sales, 399 So.2d 646 (La. CL App.), cert. denied,
401 So.2d 987 (La. 1981); Miller v. Magline, Inc., 256 N.W.2d 761 (Mich. 1977); Fendelman v. Fenco Handbag Manufacturing Co., 482 S.W.2d 461 (Mo. 1972); Salus v. Troy
Donut Univ., Inc., 460 N.E.2d 310 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983); Bermann v. Meth, 258 A.2d
521 (Pa. 1969); Lynch v. Patterson, 701 P.2d 1126 (Wyo. 1985).
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form of extended inalienable ownership. Simulated ownership is
what directors purport to offer executives, and the very existence
of performance pay begs the question of why one does not offer
genuine ownership. Indeed, ownership itself should be the yardstick for compensation.
The proposed test adds a step to compensation analysis. In
order to obtain full protection of their decisions, directors must be
capable of demonstrating that compensation packages either were
set in an entirely independent manner or compare favorably to
long-term ownership interests. The partial self-dealing aspects
inherent in compensation decisions demand such a supplemental
requirement. Implementation methods would be free to vary as the
courts provide the opportunity to evaluate individual methods of
ownership and compensation in general. Boards and compensation
committees still would enjoy all of the previous procedural
protections provided that they meet the requirements of legitimate
independence or genuine ownership. In addition, directors could
still justify plans which do not represent proprietary principles.
Boards, however, would lack full business judgment protection for
such decisions, and plaintiffs would at least be able to question the
legitimacy of pay packages.
Many proposals wrongly suggest maximizing the number of
disinterested directors on the board and the compensation committees.' 4 Although certain initial improvements may be made by
separating the key role of chairman from that of CEO, as in the
United Kingdom,24 increasing the number of other directors with
no ties to the business as well as the executives may be detrimental to the corporate enterprise on the whole and even to the pay
decision itself. Outside directors suffer from certain disadvantages
in their relationship with executives, often remain passive in
boardroom decisionmaking, and usually choose to align themselves
with management. Nonemployee directors know less about the corporation, its business, and its policies. Therefore, they possess less

N.Y.S.2d 131 (N.Y. App. Div. 1941).
240. E.g., CEO Pay: How Much Is Enough?, supra note 41, at 131-34 (solutions offered by the president of the United Shareholders Association and the National Director
of Compensation and Benefits Consulting for Arthur Andersen & Co.); Lorsch & Lipton,

supra note 149, at 78-80 (statements by managing vice-president of Korn/Ferry Consulting
and the Chair of the British Committee on Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance);
Dodell, supra note 97, at 226; Martin, supra note 19, at 244.
241. See supra text accompanying notes 150-52.
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knowledge about the worth of a particular individual's services. In
addition, the board needs to include some executives in order to
add their "invaluable" input to other corporate decisions2 42
While appearing to be less interested, nonemployee directors may
suffer from many of the same biases as employee directors, such
as working closely with the executives, relying upon executive support for their decisions, and depending on executives for their
continued position on the board. A corporate board with more
nonemployee directors may be a worse supervisory entity because
it appears to be less susceptible to manipulation when the reality
is otherwise.
In the end, someone must decide what executives will be paid.
A judge may count the noses of facially disinterested directors, but
what the director brings to the analysis is more important than his
place of business and outside contacts; what the director does in
the decisionmaking process is the crucial factor. Bringing in outside compensation consultants may be an indication of true analysis. However, courts must recognize the potential for management
biases even in the recommendations of outside consultants. The
board should not substitute a compensation consultant's proposals
for its own common sense.
The changes in procedure would not represent a slippery
slope towards the end of judicial deference in business decisions.
The newly established procedure would be limited to the executive
compensation area, an area which demands reform given its selfdealing nature. As mentioned above, such decisions are also different from the vast majority of issues facing corporate America in
that they can be resolved in a largely objective manner. Executive
compensation issues should constitute an express exception from
full-business protection. The limitation on protection would be
similar to the adjustments in corporate law, that occurred through
the antitakeover decisions.243 As with the antitakeover rulings,
the executive .compensation decisions would be confined in application to a specific environment-pay-setting decisions in the public
corporation. Moreover, legitimate compensation of any nature
could be utilized as long as it was defensible.
Ownership is the answer. In order to look beyond the symptom of high aggregate compensation levels and address the prob242. Salmon, supra note 142, at 69.
243. See supra text accompanying notes 234-35.
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lems of corporate governance, courts should encourage boards to
employ a proprietary interest regardless of its exact form. Regulatory advocacy of the ineffective and potentially detrimental performance packages must cease. Indeed, an effective judicial doctrine
based upon ownership comparisons and legitimate independence
would deter the creation of many abusive compensation packages.
The threat of actual judicial review of compensation issues should
encourage compensation committees and boards to examine pay
packages more thoroughly, comparing them against the yardstick
of genuine long-term ownership.
CONCLUSION

Grabbing someone by his W-2 does not offer the best solution for the problems presented by the compensation of executives.
Unfortunately, numerous business pundits and regulatory entities
have focused on the symptom of high societal pay levels and adopted the incentive pay system as a model of corporate governance.
Their advocacy neglects the ideal of ownership and encourages
companies to compensate executives all the way to detrimental
performance that may culminate in financial disasters similar to
those of Kidder Peabody or Barings. Ownership interpreted
through the mechanism of the courts offers a more sound approach. Society must reach beyond performance in attempts to
own the heart and mind of the corporate executive. In short, let
go of his W-2, hand him a proprietor's Schedule C, and allow the
courts to do the rest.

